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A Divided America? 
Examining the Polarization of the 
Electorate from 1974 to 2004 
 
Liz Chandler 
 
Abstract 
 To what extent are Americans divided in terms of their liberal and conservative 
preferences?  Have their opinions become more polarized over time?  Much of the recent 
literature on voter polarization suggests that there are far fewer moderate voters in the 
United States today compared to in the recent past, and that the country is in the midst of 
a massive “culture war” between liberals and conservatives.  By examining public 
opinion polls taken from the 1970s until today, this analysis finds that in contrast to the 
suggestions that these authors make in regards to voter polarization, American voters 
have not steadily become less moderate since the 1970s.  Rather, the level of polarization 
in America has tended to rise and fall over time depending on the political situation in 
the country. 
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Introduction 
 According to Greenberg, “America is divided.  We live in a moment in history 
when the two big political parties have fought to a draw, reflecting the intense 
partisanship of our times” (2005: 2).   This competition has led to the development of 
what Greenberg calls “the Two Americas—divided politically, and, increasingly, 
culturally, with distinct and counterpoised view about government, values, the family, 
and the best way of life” (2005: 5).  However, many in the field of American politics 
believe that this perceived polarization is simply a myth.  Robinson and Ellis believe that 
“pundits and political scientists have equated ‘evenly divided’ with ‘polarized,’” thus 
mistakenly attributing close electoral races to a deeply divided nation (2006: 22).  Is it 
true that Americans are no longer moderate, or is the theory of voter polarization simply 
over-exaggerated?  Have Americans become less moderate over time?  If so, what is 
causing this increasing polarization of the electorate?  These are the issues that will be 
addressed in this paper and empirically tested by examining the levels of polarization in 
various public opinion questions. 
 Before determining whether or not the electorate has become more polarized, it is 
first necessary to define the concept of “polarization.”  In their study of opinion 
polarization, DiMaggio et al. (1996) define polarization as the extent of disagreement 
between two groups of people.  This description is functional for this study, in which the 
measures of disagreement are recorded and examined over time.  In terms of public 
opinion data, polarization can also be defined as the extremity of and distance between 
responses, another useful guideline for this study.  The greater extent to which these 
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opinions move toward separate extremities and away from the middle position, the more 
polarized the group on the particular item. 
Literature Review 
In order to begin to understand the polarization of the electorate, it is important to 
first recognize that polarization is seen in terms of both partisan leanings and cultural 
attributes.  Ceaser and Busch (2005) have undertaken a thorough study of how the 
polarization of the electorate has changed over the past several decades, both in terms of 
partisanship and culture.  They point out that oftentimes, political scientists and 
sociologists alike think that this divide is primarily in terms of culture.  More specifically, 
because two groups of citizens have voted differently in recent presidential elections, 
many mistakenly believe that these citizens must be deeply divided culturally as well as 
by their partisan leanings.  According to the authors, “One ill effect of the [red state, blue 
state] color scheme is that it can contribute to this kind of dichotomous thinking” (Ceaser 
and Busch 2005: 18).  What matters most, according to Ceaser and Busch, is the relative 
degree of support for Republicans or Democrats. 
  Klinkner (2004) suggests that there is little evidence showing that the United 
States is segregated along political lines.  He has determined that although the cultural 
divide that has appeared after the 2000 election has become “accepted wisdom” about 
contemporary politics, political diversity and party competition still flourish in most of 
the country (Klinkner 2004: 1).  By portraying each state as either red or blue, the initial 
map that showed the 2000 election results by state ignored the differing levels of support 
for each candidate, thus leading some to believe that “Americans had sorted themselves 
into isolated partisan islands” (Klinkner 2004: 2).  By breaking the results down into 
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counties, Klinkner attempts to show that there is great diversity within each state.  
Furthermore, he shows that the number of counties that went to Bush or Gore in a 
landslide vote (60% or more for either candidate) is actually average relative to previous 
presidential elections.   
 Contrary to Klinkner’s article, Bishop and Cushing (2004) report that because the 
presidential outcome has become so predictable in recent election cycles, there must be 
some degree of polarization that did not exist previously.  In response to Klinkner’s data 
at the county level, Bishop and Cushing criticize Klinkner methodology for including 
third-party candidates, thus diluting the assertion that the number of county-level 
landslides was relatively large in 2000.  Bishop and Cushing look at a few case studies in 
California in an attempt to show that America is becoming more polarized.  For instance, 
in San Francisco County, the difference in Republican and Democratic votes in 1980 was 
just under 50,000; by 2000 that difference jumped to over 200,000.  Bishop and Cushing 
do not suggest reasons for this increase in county landslides, but they do expect this 
polarization to continue, and possibly become more evident, in upcoming presidential 
elections. 
 Rather than using county voting data, Fiorina (2006) uses public opinion polls to 
show that polarization in the electorate is much smaller than many political pundits think.  
He finds that voters from states that elected Bush show little difference from Kerry states 
in terms of their opinions on most issues.  Especially in terms of gay marriage and 
abortion, Fiorina has found that Americans are actually less polarized on such issues than 
they have been in previous election cycles.  The reason for this discrepancy between what 
many political scientists think and how Americans really feel is that most Americans are 
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moderate on issues rather than deeply split into two distinct camps.  According to Fiorina, 
“the electorate is closely divided…but not deeply divided,” meaning that extremely close 
elections do not represent an extremely polarized electorate (2006: 14).  In addition to the 
confusion between a closely divided and deeply divided nation, other factors that 
contribute to the myth of polarization are the media, a tendency to confuse peoples’ 
positions with their choices, and mistaking political activists’ positions with those of 
regular voters. 
Fiorina is not without his critics.  Some point out that Fiorina’s biggest mistake is 
using data collected before September 11, 2001 (Klein, 2004).  Because Americans have 
paid more attention to certain issues such as Iraq and the economy in 2004, Fiorina’s data 
from 2000 cannot be used to explain voter behavior in the 2004 election.  According to 
Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center, “In 2000, average voters were having a hard 
time telling the difference between the presidential candidates on most issues.  That’s not 
the case this year [2004]… The partisan differences between the political activists are the 
greatest I’ve seen” (Klein 2004: 27).  Contrary to Fiorina’s belief that political activists 
are unrepresentative of the larger population, Kohut has found in surveys taken in 2004 
that swing voters are actually influenced by passionate political activists.  
Once it has become established whether or not the country has become more 
polarized, it is necessary to identify factors that have contributed to this polarization.  
Some scholars blame the media for making America more polarized, or at least making it 
appear more divided.  Schudson (2002) argues that the media has increasingly become 
more like a political party than simply a news outlet, developing sophisticated strategies 
to push certain issues or ideas on the general public.  But does the media’s shaping of 
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public opinion add to the polarization of the electorate?  Hunter (1991) believes that it 
does.  He contends that the polarization is “intensified and institutionalized through the 
very media by which that discussion takes place” by defining the environment of the 
dialogue and predetermining the substance of what is communicated (Hunter 1991: 170). 
Another explanation for an increase in polarization is the divisiveness that 
resulted from the Reagan administration.  Stone, Rapoport, and Abromowitz (1990) argue 
that by sticking so closely to his party’s conservative wing, Reagan polarized the parties 
in Congress and thus electoral politics at the national level for years to come.  In fact, 
Reagan even used his office to influence public opinion, resulting in polarization over 
abortion and defense spending in particular.  Page and Shapiro claim that “on an issue he 
cares about, a president can hammer away with repeated speeches and statements and can 
expect to achieve a five or ten percentage point change in public opinion over the course 
of several months” (1992: 370).  Reagan’s right-wing agenda also led liberal activists to 
“rally their base by agreeing that Reagan was a product of an extremist fundamentalist 
movement” (Hough 2006: 181).  In this way, Reagan led the conservative voters to attach 
with the more conservative positions while driving away the more liberal voters, which 
according to these authors, has led to the polarization of the electorate. 
 A third factor that may add to the polarization of the electorate is the polarization 
within Congress.  There is much debate over whether Congress has a polarizing effect on 
the electorate or if a more divided electorate elects ideological candidates.  Jacobson 
(2000) shows in his study of party polarization that members of Congress affect the 
voters rather than the other way around.  “Voters sort themselves out politically by 
responding to the alternatives represented by the two parties” according to Jacobson 
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(2000: 25).  Fleisher and Bond (2001) also show that it is the nature of current elections 
that presents this effect on the voters.  They believe that the polarization that occurred in 
the 1980s and 1990s among voters “is not a function of a stronger role for political parties 
but is instead the consequence of the type of candidates nominated in an age of 
candidate-centered politics” (Fleisher and Bond 2001: 58).  Considering the multitude of 
literature on the polarization of the electorate, it is surprising that such inconsistency 
exists among these works.  This study will attempt to settle the debate on this topic. 
Research Design 
 
Data Collection  
 
 The public opinion data gathered to test this theory came from both the General 
Social Surveys (GSS) and the American National Election Studies (NES).  The GSS, 
produced by the National Opinion Research Center, is helpful for time-trend studies such 
as this one because it asks a wide variety of questions to its respondents, with similar or 
identical question wording each year.  The data file used here is a cumulative file of GSS 
surveys taken from 1972-2004.  Although the GSS addresses topics anywhere from 
ethnicity of respondents to information literacy, this study utilizes the survey data 
primarily to determine opinions, over time, on a range of public policy issues. 
 Similar to the GSS dataset is the NES survey, established at the University of 
Michigan’s Center for Political Studies.  This collection focuses more on specific 
questions dealing with political values, making it a helpful supplement to the GSS survey 
data.  The NES also asks many of the same questions over a long period of time.  The 
cumulative data file obtained for the years 1972-2004 has been previously recoded by the 
University of Michigan to ensure consistency over the time span.   
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 The process of deciding which research questions to use from these public 
opinion polls has important implications for answering the research question presented 
here.  If one were to test the polarization of the electorate by choosing to include only 
“hot-button” issues, such as abortion, he or she may find different results than if one had 
chosen to use more mundane, everyday issues such as social security spending.  In order 
to ensure that my research findings are as general as possible, I have made an effort to 
utilize a wide-range of issues both controversial and non-controversial while ensuring 
that each research question was available for almost all years of the study.  From the GSS 
data I have chosen questions regarding political party affiliation and ideology of 
respondent, preferences on education spending, foreign aid, welfare spending, social 
security spending, and whether or not the government should equalize wealth of its 
citizens.  The NES items chosen for this study include questions regarding the 
government’s responsibility to protect the environment, spending to fight crime, abortion, 
whether the respondent believes the government wastes tax money, the extent to which 
the respondent believes government should provide health insurance, and defense 
spending.  For a more detailed list of these variables, see Table 1. 
 In using this dataset I came across three problems.  The first of these deals with 
the limitations of the dataset in the questions asked.  Unfortunately not every question 
from either set was asked consistently through the 1974-2004 time period.  For example, 
the environmental  
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Table 1 
Variables Used from GSS and NES Datasets 
 
Item Description Range Years 
Party ID Political party affiliation 0 – 6 1974-2004 
Ideology Think of self as liberal or conservative 1 – 7 1974-2004 
Education Amount spent on improving education 
system 1 – 3 1974-2004 
Foreign Aid Amount spent on aid to foreign countries 1 – 3 1974-2004 
Welfare Amount spent on welfare payments 1 – 3 1974-2004 
Equal Wealth Government should reduce income differences between citizens 1 – 7 1978-2004 
Social Security Amount spent on social security 1 – 3 1984-2004 
Environment Amount spent on environmental protection 1 – 3 1984-2004 
Abortion Abortion be allowed by law 1 – 4 1980-2004 
Crime Amount spent on decreasing crime rates 1 – 3 1984-2004 
Government 
Waste Government wastes tax money 1 – 3 1976-2004 
Government 
Health Insurance 
Government should provide public health 
insurance 1 – 7 1976-2000 
Defense Spending Government should increase defense 
spending 1 – 7 1980-2004 
protection item was asked beginning in the year 1984 rather then 1974.  Two other 
variables were asked beginning in 1984, leaving out ten years of data.  I do not think my 
results will be distorted by this problem because I found no pattern suggesting that a 
certain type of question was over- or under-represented in the dataset.  The second 
problem with the data was the existence of the “do not know” responses and missing 
cases.  For the purposes of this study I decided to eliminate the “do not know” responses 
from the analysis.  The third problem, and probably the most debilitating in this part of 
the research design, was the absence of one year’s data from the GSS.  The dates of 
collection from this survey included the years 1972-1978, 1980, 1981-1991, 1993, 1994 
and all even-numbered years after that.  For this analysis, using just even-numbered 
years, the loss of one year’s data has been a problem.  Although the NES data does 
include all even-numbered years 1974-2004, the lack of the GSS data for 1992 greatly 
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skews the analysis.  For this reason I have decided not to include the 1992 responses for 
the NES items surveyed, creating a slight break between the years 1990 and 1994. 
Methods of Data Analysis 
 In order to determine first if the electorate has become more polarized, two types 
of data taken from these surveys will be analyzed: first the respondents’ party 
identifications and ideologies and second their responses on the public opinion questions 
mentioned above.  In order to examine the polarization by party identification and 
ideology the two GSS survey items were recoded into dummy variables.  The party 
identification variable originally had values scaled from zero to six, zero for “strong 
Democrat” and six for “strong Republican.”  Rather than being interested in the number 
of Republicans and Democrats or liberals and conservatives, for purposes of this study I 
am more interested in the number of those in the middle of the ideological spectrum.  If 
the number of moderates has gone up in the years studied here, it could be suggested that 
the electorate has become more polarized.  In order to determine if the number of voters 
identifying as Independent has gone up, a dummy variable was created: values of 
“Independent,” “Independent leaning Republican,” and “Independent leaning Democrat” 
were all given values of one, while “strong” and “not so strong” Democrats and 
Republican responses were given values of zero.  The mean values were then taken for 
each year, with declining mean values representing polarization. 
 A similar process was undertaken for ideology.  The ideology variable was 
originally coded on a one to seven scale, one being the most liberal and seven being the 
most conservative.  In order to determine if the number of moderates has increased or 
decreased since 1974, it was necessary to create a dummy variable to represent a change 
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in the number of moderate positions.  Values of “extremely liberal,” “liberal,” “extremely 
conservative,” and “conservative” were given values of zero, while values of “moderate,” 
“slightly liberal,” and “slightly moderate” were given values of one.  Similar to the party 
identification variable, the mean values decrease as the electorate becomes more 
polarized. 
 The second test used in this study is the kurtosis test. Kurtosis is the measure of 
the extent to which data points cluster around a central point, with a normal value of 
zero.1  As the data points cluster more toward the center, the distribution’s kurtosis value 
grows larger; as the points cluster more toward either side, kurtosis becomes smaller.  As 
Figure 1 shows, a larger number of data points in the middle of the distribution results in 
a higher kurtosis, whereas a higher number of data points grouped toward the outside 
results in a lower kurtosis value.  Kurtosis is  
an ideal measure of polarization because it measures the extent to which the data points 
gather towards the extreme or moderate opinions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The formula for kurtosis (k) is k = {[Σ (X – m)4 ÷ N]/s4} – 3, where m is the mean, s is the standard 
deviation, and subtracting “3” ensures that the normal distribution remains “0” (DiMaggio et al., 694). 
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Figure 1   
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Analysis 
Party Identification and Ideology 
 The first test used to determine if the electorate has become more polarized was a 
test of the party identification and ideology of respondents.  By taking the mean of the 
dummy variables for these two variables to separate moderates from non-moderates 
(recall that a mean value closer to one represents the more moderate position), interesting 
results have appeared.  First of all, voters are more prone to take the middle-of-the-road 
position ideologically than party-wise.  In other words, people would more readily regard 
themselves as moderate (rather than liberal or conservative) than as Independent (rather 
than Republican or Democrat), as shown in Figure 2.   
 Second of all, this test has shown somewhat conflicting results.  I originally 
assumed that a rise in left- or right-of-center ideology and a rise in party identification 
Kurtosis = 2    Kurtosis = 0    Kurtosis = -1.7 
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would represent an increase in polarization.  This phenomenon would be characterized by 
a decrease in the mean values of the ideology and party identification dummy variables.  
However, as Figure 2 shows, the number of self-identified moderates decreases, while 
the number of Independents increases 
over time.  These conclusions can be drawn by looking at the net change in mean values 
from 1974-2004. 
Figure 2 
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In order to get a clearer picture of the trend displayed in Figure 2, it is necessary 
to understand how moderate these small numbers of Independents are.  For the years 
1974 through 2004, exactly 65.2% of respondents identified with the Republican or 
Democratic Party, while only 22% of all respondents would describe themselves as 
liberal or conservative (see Table 2).  Although these numbers appear plausible, it is 
puzzling that only 25.4% of respondents would identify as both Independents and 
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moderates.  In fact, more moderates would call themselves Republican or Democrat than 
self-identify as an Independent. 
Although an average 65.2% of respondents identified with a party but only 31.4% 
identified themselves as liberal or conservative, the trend seems to be pushing the 
percentages of each variable closer together.  The results shown in Figure 2 may have 
been due to the polarization of the parties during this time period (Crenson and Ginsberg, 
2001).  As party platforms become less diverse in their issue positions, voters may be 
driven away from them 
Table 2 
Party ID - Ideology Crosstabulation
8172 16086 24258
22.0% 43.2% 65.2%
3499 9440 12939
9.4% 25.4% 34.8%
11671 25526 37197
31.4% 68.6% 100.0%
Count
% of Total
Count
% of Total
Count
% of Total
R or D
Independent
Party
ID
Total
Lib or Cons Moderate
Ideology
Total
 
while simultaneously feeling more prone to identify with a particular ideology on a few 
issues of importance to them.  However, by simply looking at the crosstabulation in Table 
2, it seems flawed that the number of those truly in the middle (identifying as both 
moderate and Independent) is only 25.4%.  Evidently this test is inconclusive, so it is 
necessary to turn to the results of the kurtosis test of specific issues in order to clarify.  
 
 
Kurtosis Values 
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 By taking the kurtosis values (k) of each separate question utilized then finding 
the mean value for each year, I have found a net decrease, representing a definite rise in 
polarization (see Figure 4).  In 1976, the k value was -.10, while in 2002 it dropped 
nearly .30 points to -.36.  The overall kurtosis values of all years for this study can be 
characterized as low, given that they all fall below the normal value of zero.2   
A surprising result of this test has not been the net decrease of the kurtosis values 
from 1974-2004, but the fluctuations within those years.  From 1976 to 1982, the country 
remained at a fairly steady level of polarization (k values ranging only from -.10 to -.05), 
with the overall levels remaining relatively low.  However, in the years 1982 to 1988, the 
electorate saw a steep increase in polarization.  This change is represented by the drop in 
kurtosis values from -.05 in 
Figure 3 
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Year
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1982 to a low -.37 in 1988.  To compare this period to the previous six years, 1976 to 
1982 saw an average yearly change of .01, while 1982 to 1988 shows an average change 
                                                 
2
 To see an illustration of a kurtosis value of zero, see Figure 1.  
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of -.07 per year, a fairly drastic difference.  The years from 1988 to 1994 saw another 
sharp change in polarization, but this time the polarization took an abrupt decrease rather 
than increase.3  The k values in this time period ranged from -.37 in 1988 to -.06 in 1994, 
nearly back to the same level as in 1982.  Finally, 1994 to 2004 shows a fairly steady 
increase in polarization, with kurtosis values ranging from -.06 in 1994 back down to -.36 
in 2002.   
Possible Explanations for Findings  
 As Figure 3 shows, kurtosis values representing the level of polarization have not 
remained constant throughout this time period, nor have they taken a steady, gradual 
downward path.  Instead, the kurtosis values stay relatively constant for a short period of 
time then take aggressive downward and upward jumps.  So, rather than trying to explain 
the net increase in polarization from 1972 to 2004, I will in this section try to determine 
the causes of the periodic swings in the polarization of voters.  I will break this analysis 
into three separate periods: the sharp increase in polarization seen in 1982 to 1988, the 
steep decrease from 1988 to 1994, and the relatively gradual decrease from 1994 to 2002.   
 The first increase in polarization generally correlates to the term of President 
Ronald Reagan.  Despite the fact that there was a slight decrease in polarization during 
his first two years as President, there is reason to believe that the Reagan presidency may 
have had an impact on this steep increase in polarization from 1982 to 1988.  According 
to David Von Drehle, Ronald Reagan “framed his presidency in ideological terms,” 
forcing religious conservatives away from the Democratic Party and while “making it 
uncomfortable” for liberal voters to remain with the Republican Party (2004: 16).  By 
                                                 
3
 Recall that the 1992 values are unavailable, possibly distorting these results. 
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looking back to the mean values of ideology and partisanship in the previous section 
(Figure 2), it can also be seen that both ideology and party identification increased during 
Reagan’s two terms as president, consistent with Von Drehle’s argument that Reagan 
helped voters sort themselves into separate factions.4   
 The steep decrease in polarization from 1988 to 1994 correlates to the drastic 
change in foreign policy occurring in those years.  According to a recent Pew Research 
Center study, foreign policy has a larger effect on dividing the electorate than once 
thought (Kohut, 2005).  So, judging from this conclusion, it seems fair to suggest that 
because there were relatively few controversial foreign policy initiatives occurring 
immediately after Cold War, the country was not extremely polarized because they had 
no large foreign policy questions to become divided over.  Compared to the post-
September 11th foreign policy era occurring today, there was very little controversy 
surrounding foreign policy in the early 1990s.  At this time, the Cold War was officially 
over, the Gulf War of 1990 ended quickly and successfully, and the United States was a 
nation fixed on using its foreign policy strength as a “force for good,” demonstrating not 
a lack of foreign policy focus but rather a lack of polarization on these issues (Bush, 
1989).  If Kohut’s theory is accurate, the data in this study would back up the contention 
that America was less polarized from 1988 to 1994 due to the lack of controversy in 
foreign affairs.  From 1988 to 1994, the kurtosis values of the foreign aid variable rose .6 
points from 1.22 to 1.83, showing less polarization in these years.5  So, on the whole, the 
                                                 
4
 Recall that a decrease in mean values indicates an increase in far-left/far-right party identification and 
ideology. 
5
 Notice how this variable also shows a definite lack of polarization in its positive kurtosis values.  After 
1994, the values began to fall, dropping below zero in 2000. 
40   Res Publica 
 
 
electorate was not divided on foreign policy issues from 1988 to 1994 which may 
correlate to the lack of polarization at this time. 
 The final increase in the level of polarization, occurring from 1994 to 2002, is in 
my belief a combination of two different factors: the growing polarization of Congress 
and the Bush presidency.  There is little doubt that Congress has become more polarized 
in recent years, especially since the 1994 midterm elections (Jacobson, 2000; Aldrich and 
Rohde, 2000).  But does this trend have any effect on the polarization of voters?  
Jacobson believes that it does, given his theory that “voters sort themselves out 
politically by responding to the alternatives represented by the two parties” (Jacobson 
2000: 25). One example of this occurrence was the abortion issue: the controversy first 
surfaced in Congress and then spread to the electorate (Adams, 1997).  Congress’s 
ideological divergence facilitated the move for the electorate to divide ideologically from 
1994 until now by making it easier for each voter to recognize his or her “appropriate 
ideological home” (Jacobson 2000: 26).  Jacobson’s theory is consistent with the growing 
polarization in this period.  
The more gradual increase in polarization from 2000 to 2002 may have something 
to do with both the 2000 presidential election and the aftermath of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.  If one were to break down these two years it would probably show that 
the electorate was deeply divided immediately after the 2000 election, somewhat less 
divided after the 2001 attacks, and then reverted back to their original factions again with 
the coming of the war in Iraq (Jacobson, 2003).  Jacobson claims that Bush’s first two 
years in office have “left the electorate, like the Congress, as divided and polarized as 
when he entered the White House,” which according to the results of this study is 
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accurate (2003: 728).  These events helped to slightly decelerate the growing polarization 
in the years between 2000 and 2004, with mean kurtosis values dropping only .05 points 
from 2000 to 2004 compared to a .13 drop from 1998 to 2000.  Despite this continuing 
increase in polarization after 2001, it is still too early to determine the lasting effects that 
the Iraq war and the remainder of the Bush presidency will have on the polarization of 
the electorate. 
Conclusion 
 
 Although the measure of party identification and ideology over the time period 
studied here has shown questionable results, the results of the kurtosis comparisons 
appear to be conclusive.  The time period from 1974 to 2004 has shown a variation in 
polarization rather than a consistent increase or decrease.  The pattern of polarization in 
the electorate has been relatively steady in the years from 1976-1982, took a steep 
increase in the years from 1982-1988, decreased again from 1988-1994, and has steadily 
increased from 1994 until now.  Research has shown that these variations can be 
explained by the connections between electorate polarization and the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan, the period of an agreeable foreign policy, the polarization of Congress, 
and the events of Bush presidency.  Overall, as this paper has shown, the political pundits 
that focus on the increasing polarization are correct to a certain extent.  The electorate has 
become more polarized in the last 10 or 12 years, but America is hardly in the midst of a 
“culture war…that will continue to have reverberations not only within public policy but 
within the lives of ordinary Americans everywhere” as Hunter has described (1991: xii). 
 Although these results have shown a continuous increase in polarization over the 
past ten years, there is reason to believe that this trend may have already begun to switch 
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course.  In the 2006 midterm elections, many highly-conservative Republicans were 
defeated, while many moderate Democratic candidates were elected.  Although this may 
primarily be an indication of voter’s dissatisfaction with the party in government, I 
believe that it at least partly has to do with a growing number of moderate voters.  
President Bush in his November 8th new conference also attributed the results to a more 
moderate electorate, making several references to the need for bipartisan cooperation in 
the coming years (Bush, 2006).   
If there really is a shift in the polarization of the electorate after 2006 and the 
trend does continue, it may have serious implications for the ways candidates run their 
campaigns.  Karl Rove’s strategy in 2004 included placing much more emphasis on 
mobilizing the conservative base to vote in the election rather than trying to win over 
moderates.  This may have been effective because, as Figure 3 shows on page 14, 
polarization was very high in 2004, meaning that there were probably fewer voters taking 
moderate positions on issues or voting for the more moderate candidates.  It seems that in 
2006 the Republicans stuck with this strategy, while also not working with the Democrats 
in Congress to pass more moderate legislation.  This refusal to cooperate may have also 
caused the defeat of the Republican “party machine” that had developed since 2000 
(National Review Online, 2006).  So, as shown in the 2006 election, the level polarization 
in the American voting population has two major implications: how politicians run their 
campaigns and the way they perform their duties as lawmakers.  Judging by the results of 
this study and the 2006 midterms, officeholders should not rely too much on a seemingly 
reliable base of voters whom they believe share the same ideologies, because the 
electorate will more than likely shift in terms of their level of polarization.  
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